Labour market flexibility v. job security – a comparative analysis of Swiss and Po- lish labour law regulations on fixed-term employment contracts by Ludera-Ruszel, Agata
DOI : 10.14746/pp.2015.20.3.4
Rzeszow
Labour market flexibility v. job security 
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Abstract: In the time of a knowledge-based economy, flexibility has become increasingly important for 
both employers and employees. The process of making the labour market flexible leads to the greater 
popularity of atypical forms of employment, with fixed-term employment contracts among them, which 
are considered to be less consistent with the protective function of labour law in comparison with indefi­
nite-term employment contracts. The right balance between labour market flexibility and job security 
has become a real concern. Taking into account the legal regulations on fixed-term employment con­
tracts which are now in force in Poland and Switzerland, this paper determines how that relationship has 
been shaped in those countries with reference to fixed-term employment contracts.
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1. Introduction
A  full-time employment contract for an indefinite period is traditionally consid- red the basic form of employment. An indefinite-term employment contract is 
considered to be the ‘backbone’ of the protective function of labour law, associated 
with the widest range of rights and scope of protection of the employment relation­
ship. For this reason the full-time indefinite-term employment contract is defined as 
the ‘typical’ form of employment, in contrast to other so-called ‘atypical’ forms of 
employment, among them, the fixed-term employment contract (Weiss, 2011, p. 47). 
Atypical forms of employment are often opposite to the idea of job security. They 
are associated with uncertain and insecure employment, and therefore with greater 
risk of poverty and social exclusion, especially in cases where atypical employment 
is not a stepping stone to standard employment (OECD, 2002). It is emphasised 
that considerable differences in the level of protection between an employment con­
tract for an indefinite-term and a fixed-term employment contract in the long-term 
perspective lead to labour market segmentation into low-income, insecure workers 
(called outsiders) and those with open-ended contracts (called insiders) (Cabrales, 
Dolado, Mora, 2014, p. 3).
However, in a time of making the labour market more flexible, the spread of atypical 
forms of employment, including fixed-term employment contracts, is an inevitable pro­
cess. It is emphasised that atypical forms of employment to a greater extent facilitate an 
employer’s ability to adapt quickly to market fluctuations, and allow employees to find 
a place in the labour market if due to some circumstances they cannot, or simply do not 
want to, work under a full-time indefinite-term employment contract (De Grip, Hoeven-
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berg, Willems, 1997, p. 52). As a result, the number of fixed-term employment contracts 
in Europe has been gradually growing since the 1980s (Eurostat, 2003). The global eco­
nomic crisis of 2008-2010 only accelerated this process. As a result, in 2011, in as many 
as eight European countries more than 15% of workers were employed on a fixed-term 
employment contract basis. Switzerland was below this rate. In Switzerland, a large 
group of fixed-term contracts are linked with the vocational training system. As a result, 
in this country, contrary to Poland, the fixed-term contract in most cases plays the role of 
a so-called ‘bridge’ to permanent employment. In Poland, the proportion of fixed-term 
employment contracts is one of the highest in Europe and covers more than a quarter of all 
the employed (OECD, 2014). However, this group is mostly made up of young people 
(15-29 year old), women, less-educated and lower-skilled workers, for whom a fixed-term 
employment contract is usually not a voluntary choice (Eurostat, 2014; OECD, 2014).
With this regard, there is still a heated, ongoing debate on how to reach the right bal­
ance between labour market flexibility and job security. It is emphasised that good bal­
ance between labour market flexibility and job security is achieved “when labour input 
can be easily and quickly adjusted to the needs of labour demand by assuring, at the same 
time, a reasonable level of protection for workers” (De Gobbi, Nesporova, 2005). Usually 
it is necessary to reconcile the often contradictory interests of the parties to the employ­
ment relationship. Taking into account the legal regulations on fixed-term employment 
contracts which are now in force in Poland and Switzerland, the aim of this paper is to de­
termine whether that relationship in those countries is reasonable with reference to 
fixed-term employment contracts.
2. The run towards greater labour market flexibility
There are a number of different definitions of labour market flexibility. According to 
neo-liberalism, labour market flexibility refers to the “ease of labour market institutions 
in enabling labour markets to reach a continuous equilibrium determined by the intersec­
tion of the demand and supply curve” (Standing, 1989). Her Majesty’s Treasury (HM 
Treasury)1 has provided three basic “overall” definitions of labour market flexibility. 
“Flexibility as the speed with which the labour market can adjust in response to an eco­
nomic shock; a flexible labour market as one that exhibits a good equilibrium, i.e. a low 
structural unemployment rate; a flexible labour market as one that has institutional fea­
tures that allow wages and employment to adjust smoothly and freely to equate supply 
with demand” (HM Treasury, 2003, p. 9). Atkinson has distinguished between four dif­
ferent types of labour market flexibility, which include “external numerical flexibility”, 
“internal numerical flexibility”, “functional flexibility” and “financial or wage flexibil­
ity” (Atkinson, 1984). In later works we can also find other types of flexibility, such as 
“locational flexibility” and “flexibility of place” (Reilly, 2001; Wallace, 2003). Employ­
ment protection legislation, including the use of temporary employment contracts, is the 
predominant factor in the measure of external labour market flexibility, which refers to
1 The United Kingdom’s Economics and Finance Ministry.
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the capacity to quickly and efficiently adjust the volume of work to the changes in de­
mand (Matusik, Hill, 1998).
The transition from Fordism to the post-Fordist model and from industrialisation to 
post-industrialisation at the end of the 20th century, accompanied by the process of 
globalisation, has completely changed the nature and organisation of labour. Mass pro­
duction has shifted to specialisation, with the predominant significance of the service sec­
tor and skilled workers. Labour and workforce are still not homogeneous. At the same 
time, the labour market began to be associated with uncertainty and continuous change, 
which was linked with the process of increasing popularity of atypical forms of employ­
ment. The pressure to become more flexible has become significantly more important for 
both employers and employees, and at the same time it means they have to face new chal­
lenges. For the employer, remaining flexible is necessary to acquire and maintain a com­
petitive edge in view of unexpected changes in the demand on the labour market. In the 
literature we may find studies that examine the positive link between organisational flexi­
bility and competitiveness (Nandakumar, Jharkharia, Nair, 2014). It is emphasised that 
organisational flexibility enables a quick and effective response to a variety of market 
changes in the competitive environment (Volberda, 1996); it refers to the capability to 
quickly react to the opportunities and challenges created by such an environment 
(Sanchez, 1995). On the other hand, for the employee it is connected with the necessity to 
continuously acquire new skills and abilities in order to adapt to new working practices as 
a condition of maintaining employment (Balaneasa, 2013, p. 14). However, flexibility 
may also be used by employees to “adjust working life and working hours to their own 
preferences and to other activities” (Jepsen, Klammer, 2004, p. 157). A. Edmans, L. Li 
and Ch. Zhang have found that “the recruitment, retention, and motivational benefits of 
employee satisfaction are most valuable in countries in which firms face fewer con­
straints on hiring and firing. These benefits are lower in countries with inflexible labour 
markets, leading to a downward shift in the marginal benefit of expenditure on employee 
welfare” (Edmans, Li, Zhang, 2014, p. 20).
3. Labour market flexibility and job security
Job security is a type of security that derives from employment protection legislation 
(EPL) and is associated with restrictions placed on the employer’s power to hire and fire 
employees at will. Job security regulations consist of two aspects. Firstly, they refer to the 
limits on the employer’s capacity to dismiss employees, usually protecting employees 
against arbitrary dismissal. Secondly, they place certain limits on the employer’s ability 
to hire employees on a temporary basis (Emmenegger, 2014, p. 2). Job security regula­
tions strongly affect labour market flexibility. The more rigid employment protection leg­
islation, the lower the level of employer’s ability to freely adjust labour to changing 
market needs. The reason for job security regulations is the core goal of labour law, which 
is counteracting the imbalances of bargaining power of employees (Kahl-Freund, 1979, 
p. 7). The employment relationship has to be considered as a specific legal relationship 
(sui generis legal relationship) that is completely different from legal relationships which 
arise from civil law contracts. Since labour as the subject in an employment relationship
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is not a commodity,2 the labour market is not the same as the market in general (Weiss, 
2011, p. 44). Among all labour market institutions, job security regulations are consid­
ered to be the most controversial (Blanchard, Tirole, 2003, p. 2). The debate over the eco­
nomic effects of such regulations has not yet been settled. Some authors argue that 
restrictions on dismissals of workers are the most vilified labour market institution 
(Quiggin, 2010, p. 17), and maintain that employment protection laws have spoilt eco­
nomic performance and led to the segmentation of the labour market and unemployment. 
Others state that that those regulations are not harmful for economic efficiency.3 The Em­
ployment Protection Legislation Index elaborated by the OECD has remained the com­
mon instrument for measuring the strictness of the national employment protection 
legislation and thus the level of job security.
Job security has to be differentiated from employment and income security, both of 
which are more consistent with the idea of labour market flexibility. The first one is asso­
ciated with employability, which means an employee’s ability to “continue their employ­
ment career, either in another job with their current employer or in another job with 
another employer, whenever they need or want to” (WRR, 2007). This may be ensured, 
for example, by investing in the vocational training of an employee. Security of income 
refers to adequate expected income even in the case of unemployment, for instance 
through social security benefits (Emmenegger, 2014, p. 2).
4. Fixed-term employment contract -  the attempts to reconcile labour 
market flexibility and job security in Poland and Switzerland
Both Poland and Switzerland are countries with a relatively high level of external nu­
merical flexibility. However, in Switzerland this generally refers both to open-ended and 
fixed-term employment contracts alike, while in Poland only to the latter. Polish regula­
tions on fixed-term employment contracts are disproportionally liberal compared to in­
definite-term employment contracts; they enable the employer to quickly adjust labour to 
demand. The high discrepancy between job security regulations concerning indefi­
nite-term and fixed-term employment contracts in Poland means that fixed-term employ­
ment contracts are commonly overused by employers, who perceive them as an ‘attractive’ 
alternative to permanent employment contracts, allowing them the straightforward con­
clusion and termination of the employment relationship. In Switzerland, where the labour 
market is not so strictly regulated as it is in Poland, there is a tendency for permanent con­
tracts to resemble more the conditions of fixed-term employment contracts (Brun- 
ner-Patthey, 2007). The discrepancy in terms of protection, especially against arbitrary 
dismissal, between a fixed-term employment contract and a contract for an indefi­
nite-term is not so large. As a result, in Switzerland the fixed-term employment contract 
is not considered by the employers as such an ‘attractive’ form of employment (Greppi
2 It is also the main principle on which the International Labour Organisation (ILO) is based. It was 
included in The Declaration of Philadelphia of 10 April 1944.
3 (Micco, Pages, 2007), including the description of views on this issue.
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et al., 2010, p. 8). Therefore, employers are less eager to abuse fixed-term employment 
contracts.
Apart from the replacement of employment contracts in cases of justified absence 
from work, which is a separate type of fixed-term employment contract, in Poland con­
cluding a fixed-term employment contract is not limited by legal regulations to any cases 
justified by the nature of the employment or the unanimous consent of the parties. The sit­
uation is the same in Switzerland, where no limitations are placed on the valid use of 
fixed-term employment contracts in the Swiss Code of Obligation. Only Article 334 of 
the Swiss Code of Obligations directly states that a fixed-term employment contract that 
is tacitly renewed is deemed an indefinite-term employment contract. In Poland, the same 
rule was introduced by case law.4 In Poland, the level of protection against abuses arising 
from using fixed-term employment contracts increased in 2003. It was due to adopting 
the regulation of Article 251 of the Polish Labour Code, connected with the implementa­
tion of the provisions of the directive of the Council 99/70/EC on fixed-term work that 
placed restrictions on an employer’s power to use such contracts.5 Article 251 of the Pol­
ish Labour Code has placed limitations on an employer’s free will to repeatedly use 
fixed-term employment contracts with the same employee. As a result, a third fixed-term 
employment contract with the same employee is considered to be an indefinite-term em­
ployment contract, unless the break between the termination of the previous contract and 
conclusion of the next contract exceeded one month. Moreover, i f -  during the term of the 
fixed-term employment contract -  the parties agree on a longer employment period, it is 
equivalent to concluding another, consecutive fixed-term employment contract. That rule 
does not apply to employment contracts for a fixed term that are concluded to substitute 
an employee during a justified absence from work, or to perform occasional or seasonal 
work, or periodic tasks. However, the adoption of the regulation of Article 251ofthe Pol­
ish Labour Code de facto has not changed the situation. Therefore, the coherence of this 
regulation with the goal of the directive 99/70/EC is, not entirely without reason, strongly 
challenged by the doctrine of labour law (Łapiński, 2011, pp. 288-291). Employers de­
cide either to conclude a long-term, fixed-term employment contract, or to conclude an­
other contract after the lapse of the one-month period of break. The weakness of the above 
regulation of Article 251 of the Polish Labour Code has been pointed out by the European 
Commission in the proceedings initiated against Poland in connection with the improper 
implementation of the directive 99/70/WE (European Labour Law Network, 2014, p. 3). 
In Switzerland the use of “chain fixed-term employment contracts” without any objective 
grounds (economic or social reasons) and aiming at circumventing the law of dismissal is 
considered prohibited by the Swiss Federal Tribunal on the grounds of Article 2(2) of the 
Swiss Civil Code on fraud. The Swiss Federal Tribunal regards as objectively legitimate,
4 However, the employment contract will be considered as concluded for a fixed term if such can be 
deduced from its circumstances -  see e.g. judgement of Polish Supreme Court of 17 May 1995,1 PRN 
11/95, OSNP 1995, No. 20, item 250.
5 Council Directive 99/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term 
work concluded by BusinessEurope (UNICE), European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation 
(CEEP) and European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (Official Journal L 175,10/07/1999) -h e re ­
after referred to as directive 99/70/EC.
60 Agata LUDERA-RUSZEL PP 3 '15
for example, successive fixed-term contracts based on the uncertainty of the employer as 
to their future structure, when at the same time this situation has not been hidden from 
the employee.
In Switzerland, protection against arbitrary dismissal for both types of employment 
contract was significantly improved in 1988,6 while in Poland those regulations re­
mained almost unchanged after the adoption of the Labour Code in 1974. In Poland, the 
ability to end a fixed-term employment contract before its final date is not limited to se­
rious cases, as an ordinary dismissal is also possible. The stabilisation of the employ­
ment relationship as regards fixed-term contracts is a fact only in the case of contracts 
concluded for a term of at least six months. According to Article 33 of the Polish Labour 
Code, the ability to terminate a fixed-term employment contract applied only to a con­
tract concluded for a period longer that six months in which the parties agreed upon 
such a possibility, which -  however -  is the principle in reality. In this case the em­
ployer is allowed to terminate a fixed-term employment contract at any time, without 
giving any reasons or the necessity of consulting the intention to terminate with the 
trade union organisation that represents the employee. The above mentioned obliga­
tions refer only to indefinite-term employment contracts. An employee has no ability to 
challenge a decision that is made fully at the employer’s discretion. In contrast to the in­
definite-term employment contract, the statutory term of giving a notice of termination 
in the case of a fixed-term contract is two weeks, irrespective of its term or the period of 
service of the employee at the establishment. As a result, the protection against arbi­
trary dismissal of a fixed-term employee only exists in the case of its immediate termi­
nation, which is limited to just cause. The Swiss legal regulation on fixed-term 
employment contracts provides more security for a fixed-term employee. The expira­
tion of the fixed term remains the basic way in which the employment relationship co­
mes to an end. Therefore, the earlier termination of the employment relationship by one 
of the parties is an exception and generally is only possible in extraordinary situations 
and limited to just cause. The termination for a cause refers, in particular, to any circum­
stance which renders the continuation of the employment relationship in good faith un­
conscionable for the party giving notice (Article 337(2) of The Swiss Code of Obligation). 
However, Swiss courts are very reluctant to accept just cause as a ground for valid ter­
mination of an employment contract, usually they make it conditional on the previous 
formal admonition of the employer. At the same time, that regulation remains flexible, 
as the parties are free to agree on notice periods despite the fixed employment term. 
Moreover, termination with six months’ notice applies in the case of a long-term em­
ployment contract that lasts at least ten years. However, in the case of termination with 
notice of both fixed-term and indefinite-term employment contracts, the employer is 
obliged to provide the reasons at the employee’s request. As a result, the termination of 
a fixed-term employment contract may not occur at the employer’s discretion and in 
both cases may be challenged by the employee.
6 Seethe amendment to the Swiss Code of Obligation by No I of the Federal Act of 18 March 1988, 
in force since 1 Jan. 1989 (AS 1988 1472 1479; BBl 1984 II 574).
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5. Conclusions
As far as temporary employment is concerned, the right balance between labour 
market flexibility and job security may be achieved when this type of employment is 
not abused by the employer in cases not justified by the nature of employment or com­
patible interests of the parties. A fixed-term employment contract may -  in certain 
fields, professions and jobs -  be an acceptable and desirable solution for both parties in 
the employment relationship at the time of the struggle to remain flexible in the labour 
market. Thus, concluding a fixed-term employment contract may be justified in cases 
of temporary, increased demand for work, employment of workers for specific project 
tasks, for campaigns, for terms of office in the bodies of a legal entity, for the period of 
training, in order to prepare for a new profession or to gain further qualifications, and fi­
nally when the parties find it justifiable and express mutual consent (Ludera-Ruszel, 
2014, p. 597). At the same time, the level of protection of fixed-term employees against 
arbitrary dismissal has to coincide to some extent with the level of protection with re­
gard to permanent employment in order to make it less ‘attractive’ for the employer when 
compared with the more secure indefinite-term employment contract. The fixed-term 
employees may expect that the employment contract will last until the agreed final date, 
however earlier termination also has to be possible for the parties on principles that are 
not too far removed from the rules that apply to indefinite-term employment contracts. 
The Swiss regulation on fixed-term employment contracts represents a better balance 
between labour market flexibility and job security than the respective regulation that is 
now in force in Poland. This is partially so because labour law in Switzerland is not so 
strictly regulated, allowing formore freedom of parties. Thus, Swiss labour law is more 
flexible, responding to a greater extent to the needs of employer resulting from the 
changing market environment. At the same time, that regulation provides job security 
for fixed-term employees, which does not deviate so much from the security of those 
employed for an indefinite term. Although the conclusion of a fixed-term employment 
contract in either country has been limited to so-called ‘objective grounds’, in Switzer­
land, unlike in Poland, where there is a huge discrepancy in the level of protection, em­
ployers are less tempted to abuse fixed-term employment contracts over the cases 
justified by the nature of this type of employment contract or the reasonable interest of 
the parties involved.
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Elastyczność rynku pracy vs. bezpieczeństwo zatrudnienia -  analiza porównawcza 
polskich i szwajcarskich regulacji prawa pracy w zakresie umowy o pracę na czas
określony
Streszczenie
W dobie gospodarki opartej na wiedzy, elastyczność staje się istotna dla pracodawcy i pracownika. 
Dążenie do większej elastyczności na rynku pracy powoduje wzrost popularności atypowych form za­
trudnienia, w tym także umowy o pracę na czas określony, które jednak są uważane za mniej bezpieczną 
formę zatrudnienia w porównaniu do umowy o pracę na czas nieokreślony. W tych warunkach istotnym 
wyzwaniem staje się zachowanie właściwej równowagi między elastycznością rynku pracy a bezpieczeń­
stwem zatrudnienia. Opierając się na analizie regulacji prawnych o umowie o pracę na czas określony 
obowiązujących w Polsce i w Szwajcarii, przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest ustalenie jak powyższy 
stosunek został ukształtowany w odniesieniu do umowy o pracę na czas określony.
Słowa kluczowe: elastyczność, bezpieczeństwo zatrudnienia, umowa o pracę na czas określony, Polska, 
Szwajcaria
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